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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, NPG

SUBJECT: PROPOSED INTRODUCTION FOR MIT INTERIM REPORT

1. REQUEST THIS MESSAGE BE PROVIDED, AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, TO DR. IAN SHAW, ASSISTANT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR (STUDIES), MOD, MAIN BUILDING, WHATEHALL (TELEPHONE: 01-218-2566). QUOTE: DEAR DR. SHAW: PER OUR DISCUSSION AT THE MIT MEETING IN ROME ON 6 MARCH, AN ALTERNATIVE INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERIM MIT REPORT IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION WHEN YOU REDRAFT VOLUME 1. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROPOSED INTRODUCTION MAY SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT THE US HAD WITH YOUR ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY SATISFYING THE CONCERN OF OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT THE POLITICAL AND "MOTIVATIONAL" HISTORY OF THE MIT REPORT BE RETAINED ESSENTIALLY AS PROVIDED IN YOUR DRAFT. PARAGRAPH 11 HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN AN EFFORT TO SATISFY BOTH US AND FRG CONCERNS REGARDING THE "OFFENSE/DEFENSE" ARGUMENTS USED, AS WELL AS TO PROVIDE A LEAD-IN FOR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON

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ACTIONS FOR THE NPG. (SIGNED: JOHN V. HEMLER,
COLONEL, USA, CHIEF, US MIT DELEGATION)

BEGIN QUOTE OF ATTACHMENT:

1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. IN THE PAST, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS HAVE OFTEN COMBINED TO CHANGE, IN A SIGNIFICANT MANNER, THE WAY IN WHICH WARS ARE FOUGHT. IN THE LAST DECADE, THE PACE OF NEW AND INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS SEEMS TO HAVE ACCELERATED, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN TARGET ACQUISITION AND IDENTIFICATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL RESPONSE TIMES, DELIVERY SYSTEM RANGE AND ACCURACY, AND IMPROVEMENTS IN BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR MUNITIONS DESIGN HAVE PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SELECTIVE IMPROVEMENTS OF BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. FURTHER, ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS FORECAST OVER THE NEXT TEN YEAR PERIOD SEEM TO POINT TO EVEN MORE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES.

2. PHASE I FOLLOW-ON USE STUDIES CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD 1969-1973 DID NOT CONSIDER MANY OF THESE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS IN THEIR ANALYSES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM, IN A 1973 STATUS REPORT (1) STATED THAT "...IT HAS BECOME APPARENT TO THE STUDY TEAM THAT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF NEW GUIDANCE SYSTEMS, COULD HAVE A POTENTIAL IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SINCE A FULL EXAMINATION OF THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE BEYOND ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE AND IN ANY EVENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN A WIDER FORUM, THE STUDY TEAM SUGGESTS THAT THE NPG SHOULD CONSIDER THE ADVISABILITY OF A SEPARATE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS."

3. AS A RESULT OF A SIMILAR RECOMMENDATION BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES, THE NPG MINISTERS AT THEIR
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MEETING IN THE HAGUE IN NOVEMBER 1973 INVITED (2) THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO "ARRANGE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THOSE NEW DEVELOPMENTS FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION AT A FUTURE MEETING."

4. IN AN ARRANGEMENTS PAPER SETTING UP THE STUDY (3), THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY GROUP WAS PROVIDED WITH A BROAD MANDATE, WHICH STATES THAT "IN GENERAL TERMS, THE TASK OF THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY GROUP INCLUDES CONTRIBUTING TO NPG KNOWLEDGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THESE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NPG, AS APPROPRIATE, FOR FOLLOW-UP ACTION."

PURPOSE

5. TO ASSIST THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY GROUP IN ITS TASK, TWO TEAMS, A MILITARY IMPLICATIONS TEAM (MIT) AND A POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS TEAM (PIT) WERE FORMED. THIS PAPER IS VOLUME I OF AN INTERIM REPORT BY THE MIT; IT IS AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS ON MILITARY ACTION, AND IS DESIGNED TO ASSIST THE MINISTERS IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF ANY CHANGES OR REFINEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE IMPLIED IN NATO'S EXISTING CONCEPTS OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES RECENTLY ADDED OR TO BE ADDED IN THE COMING YEARS.

VOLUME II PROVIDES MORE DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, DESCRIBES THE SEVERAL TARGETING ANALYSES PERFORMED AND PROVIDES THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND RATIONALE REQUIRED TO LEAD TO AND SUPPORT THE IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS DISCUSSED IN VOLUME I. THE PERMISSIVE GUIDELINES PROVIDED FOR THIS STUDY OF MILITARY IMPLICATIONS IS AT ANNEX A.

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SCOPE OF THE STUDY-GENERAL

6. THE MANDATE SUGGESTED BY STAFF AND APPROVED BY MINISTERS SPEAKS OF THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE NOT TOUCHED ON ALL SUCH QUESTIONS IN THIS REPORT; INSTEAD WE HAVE DIRECTED OUR ATTENTION TO A LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. BEFORE GETTING INTO A DESCRIPTION AND DISCUSSION OF THESE ASPECTS THAT ARE COVERED IN THIS INTERIM REPORT, HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM USEFUL TO DESCRIBE BOTH THE IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT BOUNDARIES OR LIMITS OF OUR EFFORT. THE IMPLICIT CONSIDERATIONS ARE DESCRIBED BELOW IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE MOTIVATIONS IN THE MIT EFFORT, AS OPPOSED TO PROVIDING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF TECHNOLOGY. OTHER BOUNDARIES DESCRIBED BELOW ARE MORE EXPLICIT IN NATURE AND SIMPLY PROVIDE THE LIMITS OF THE ACTUAL REPORT. THE FORMER WILL BE DISCUSSED FIRST.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY (POLITICAL BOUNDARIES/CONSIDERATIONS)

7. SEVERAL MAJOR ELEMENTS OR IDEAS SEEM TO UNDERLIE

NATO'S CONCEPTS FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
THESE ELEMENTS, STATED IN PERHAPS OVER SIMPLIFIED FASHION,
ARE:

FIRST: THE THEME, DEVELOPED IN THE 'PROVISIONAL
POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR NATO'S INITIAL DEFENSIVE USE
OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS' THAT THE AIM OF FIRST USE
IS TO RESTORE DETERRENCE BY INDUCING A CHANGE OF MIND
IN SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERS THROUGH THE DEMONSTRATION
OF NATO'S RESOLVE AND DETERMINATION RATHER THAN ACHIEVING
A DIRECT AND TOTAL SOLUTION IN MILITARY TERMS. WHILE
OUR REPORT HAS NOT DEALT SPECIFICALLY WITH THE IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON THE POLITICAL DECISIONS
OF EITHER SIDE, NEVERTHELESS, CERTAIN OF THE DEVELOPMENTS,
--PARTICULARLY THOSE DEALING WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN INFORMA-
TION PROCESSING, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND THOSE THAT SEEM
TO PERMIT MORE DISCRIMINATE BATTLEFIELD CONVENTIONAL
AND NUCLEAR TARGETING OPTIONS--WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCH CONCERN AS ESCALATION, TIMELY

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IDENTIFICATION OF THE TYPE AND SCOPE OF AGGRESSION AND
POLITICAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR USE. THEREFORE, IT MAY
BE USEFUL FOR THESE AVENUES TO BE EXPLORED FURTHER
OUTSIDE MIT.

SECOND: THE INDICATION - DEVELOPED IN THE PHASE-II
REPORT (4) FROM THE RESULTS OF THE PHASE I REGIONAL
STUDIES - THAT NATO'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD NOT BE
COUNTED ON IN ACTUAL CONFLICT TO OFFSET CONVENTIONAL
WEAKNESS AGAINST AN ENEMY WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
OF HIS OWN, AND WITH THE DETERMINATION TO USE THEM.
IN GENERAL TERMS, THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS TO
BE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT HAVE BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
AND THEIR POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT
OF MUCH SPECULATION AND OPEN DEBATE. ARTICLES IN PUBLIC
JOURNALS, SOMETIMES OVER THE SIGNATURE OF WELL-
KNOWN COMMENTATORS ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, HAVE TENDED TO
SUGGEST THAT NEW CAPABILITIES COULD BRING A CHANGE IN
THE NATURE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE OF SUCH SIGNIF-
ICANCE AS TO BRING INTO QUESTION THE BASIC PREMISES
STATED ABOVE. SIGNOR BROSIO, IN HIS 1971 REPORT (6)
ALSO SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTING THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF
LOWER YIELD, TOGETHER WITH OTHER FACTORS (E.G., CHANGES
IN FORCE STRUCTURE, DIFFERENT CONCEPTS AND TACTICS,
MODIFIED ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLITICAL CONTROL) MIGHT
PROVIDE "A MEANS BY WHICH POTENTIAL AGGRESSION EVEN WITH

SUPERIOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES CAN BE FRUSTRATED WHILE
COLLATERAL DAMAGE IS KEPT WITHIN ACCEPTABLE PROPORTIONS."
IN OUR REPORT, WE HAVE DEVOTED A CONSIDERABLE SPACE TO
DISCUSSION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES

TO THE CONVENTIONAL LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD, AS WELL AS THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEG, IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD BENEFIT FROM DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE HITHERTO BEEN THOUGHT TO IMPACT ONLY ON THE NUCLEAR (E.G., C3 TARGET ACQUISITION, ACCURACY). BUT WE HAVE NOT TAKEN ANALYSES SO FAR AS TO TRY TO DEMONSTRATE SOME THEATER-WIDE ADVANTAGE TO USING A NEW TECHNOLOGY FORCE. THIS IS BEYOND OUR MEANS AT PRESENT.

THIRD: THERE IS A NEED NOT TO BLUR THE 'NUCLEAR THRESHOLD'
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BUT TO KEEP ITS CROSSING AS AN UNMISTAKEABLE CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF MILITARY ACTION AS STATED IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES. IN THE REPORT CITED EARLIER, SIGNOR BROSIO, SUGGESTED THAT, WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN (NUCLEAR) WEAPONS, FORCE STRUCTURE AND IMPROVED CONCEPTS/TACTICS, "THE INDISPENSABLE POLITICAL CONTROL MIGHT BE EXERCISED IN A MORE FLEXIBLE FASHION SO THAT MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS BETTER ASSURED." THE CONVENIENT TITLE OF 'MINI-NUKES' HAS BEEN COINED BY OTHERS, AND THE USE OF THIS TERM, SELDOM CLEARLY DEFINED, HAS CAUSED CONCERN THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS - A DISTINCTION ESSENTIAL IN THE NATO NUCLEAR THRESHOLD CONCEPT - WAS IN DANGER OF BEING LOST. DR. SCHLESINGER, WHILE US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HAS, HOWEVER, STATED EXPLICITLY (6) THAT THE US HAS IN DEVELOPMENT NO NUCLEAR WARHEADS OF YIELDS LESS THAN THOSE ALREADY DEPLOYED IN NATO, I.E., THE US WAS NOT INTERESTED IN MINI-NUKES, ESPECIALLY IF THEY WERE TO BE DEFINED AS WEAPONS. THUS THE TERM MINI-NUKE, THOUGH CONVENIENT, IS POTENTIALLY MISLEADING, AND IT WILL NOT BE USED AGAIN IN THIS PAPER.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY (MILITARY AND ANALYTIC BOUNDARIES)

8. THE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS DESCRIBED AND TARGET ANALYSES PERFORMED ARE CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE LAND BATTLE AND ITS ASSOCIATED AIR OPERATIONS. THIS RESTRICTION WAS IMPOSED PRIMARILY IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING THE STUDY MANAGEABLE AND ALSO BECAUSE THE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST SEEM TO BE PRIMARILY INVOLVED WITH THE LAND/AIR BATTLE. FURTHER, THE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ANALYSES ARE DESCRIBED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TOTAL PROCESS OF TARGET ENGAGEMENT ON THE BATTLEFIELD INCLUDING: TARGET ACQUISITION AND IDENTIFICATION, RESPONSE TIMES, DELIVERY SYSTEM RANGE AND ACCURACY, AND WARHEAD DESIGN.

9. ALTHOUGH OUR STUDY DISCUSSES, AT LEAST TO SOME EXTENT, HOW THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER MIGHT EFFECT THE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF BOTH NATO AND THE WP, IT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO JUDGE

WHAT THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IS AT PRESENT OR MAY BE
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IN THE FUTURE. THERE IS, OF COURSE, GREAT INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION SINCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT NATO MIGHT EVER HAVE TO FACE THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENSE IS IN PART DEPENDENT UPON THE STRENGTH OF ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES AVAILABLE TO RESIST WP CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION.

10. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO MAKE DETAILED COST-EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISONS BETWEEN NEW AND OLD SYSTEMS, IN PART BECAUSE NEW SYSTEMS ENTER, AND HAVE BEEN ENTERING, NATO GRADUALLY, MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO SAY WHEN "OLD" STOPPED AND "NEW" BEGAN. THE ESTIMATION OF COSTS OF SYSTEMS IN EARLY STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT IS NOTORIOUSLY UNRELIABLE, WITHOUT DETAILED STUDY OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN ENEMY TACTICS AND LIKELY ENEMY COUNTERMEASURES, BOTH PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL. SUCH STUDIES ARE AND WILL NO DOUBT BE MADE BY NATIONS FACING DEFENSE RE-EQUIPMENT DECISIONS. NEVERTHELESS, SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ARE MADE IN SECTION II.

11. IN THIS INTERIM REPORT, THE EFFECT OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SEVERAL FUNCTIONS OF TARGET ENGAGEMENT--THEATER BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION, INFORMATION PROCESSING, MUNITIONS DELIVERY AND MUNITIONS EFFECTIVENESS--HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED, AND TO SOME EXTENT, THE TOTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMPLETE TARGET ENGAGEMENT PROCESS HAS BEEN ANALYTICALLY ASSESSED. NEVERTHELESS, ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR DOING THIS TYPE OF TOTAL ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT ARE NOT WELL IN HAND. NEITHER HAVE WE ASSESSED THE DETAILED IMPLICATIONS THAT THESE NEW DEVELOPMENTS MAY HAVE ON TACTICS, FORCE STRUCTURE OR OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES--SINCE MILITARY STAFFS, UTILIZING WARGAMES, EXERCISES AND OTHER OPERATIONAL TOOLS, SEEM BETTER SUITED TO CONDUCT THESE ANALYSES. FURTHER, IN THIS REPORT WE HAVE NOT DONE A COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT OF WP/NATO TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS NECESSARY TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE "LEAD/LAG" ASPECTS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES THAT MAY ACCRUE TO THE SIDE HAVING THEM. IN SPITE OF THESE DRAWBACKS, THE MIT HAS ATTEMPTED, THROUGH A JUDGMENTAL AND DISCUSSION PROCESS, TO PROVIDE

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ITS COLLECTIVE OPINION IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION, FOR EACH OF THE CAPABILITIES/DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED: WILL THIS BE OF GREATER VALUE TO THE DEFENSE (NATO) OR THE

OFFENSE (WP)? IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THESE OFFENSE/
DEFENSE JUDGMENTS PROVIDE A USEFUL FRAMEWORK UNDER
WHICH THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS AND ANALYSES MENTIONED
ABOVE CAN PROCEED.

REFERENCES:

(1) NPG/D (73) 15, 16 OCTOBER 1973, ANNEX, PARAGRAPH 5.

(2) NPG/D (73) 16, 8 NOVEMBER 1973, PARAGRAPH 30.

(3) NPG/D (74) 3, 10 APRIL 1974.

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(5) PO/71/226, 10 MAY 1971.

(6)

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